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Paradoxes of “Decarbonization”
David B. Spence†
Despite continuing skepticism among the ideological right
about climate science,1 scholars and policymakers continue to
debate the shape of a post-carbon world, and how fast the United
States can “decarbonize”2 its energy sector. Decarbonization is
creeping forward, pushed along by market forces and a suite of
federal, state, and local policies favoring renewable energy.
Federal tax credits for renewables—frequently on life support, but
never dead—have long buoyed the industry,3 as has the spread of
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in the states.4 Together these
two policy instruments have helped renewables compete against
the traditional sources of electric generation (coal-fired, gas-fired,
and nuclear power) for three decades, and deserve some credit for
the improved efficiencies and cost reductions in wind and solar
technologies over that time.
† Professor of Law, Politics and Regulation, University of Texas at Austin
School of Law and McCombs School of Business. The author would like to thank all
those who commented on the paper at the Trager Symposium, Post-Carbon World:
Advances in Legal and Social Theory (Feb. 19, 2016).
1 See, e.g., Ned Resnikoff, Senate Committee Again Debates Existence of
Climate Change, MSNBC (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/all/senate-republicans-
what-climate-change [https://perma.cc/7MWM-BNU5] (in which Senator Jim Inhofe
repeated his view that climate change science is a hoax).
2 The terms “decarbonize” and “decarbonization” are awkward, in part because
they are not the antonyms of “carbonize” and “carbonization,” which refer to the chemical
process of deriving carbon from organic matter using pyrolysis. Instead, they are verbs
invented to refer to the process of reducing or removing fossil fuels from the electric
generation mix. As used by energy policy scholars, “deep” decarbonization usually refers
to the complete elimination of fossil fuels from the generation mix.
3 For a summary of the history of tax credits, see Felix Mormann, Fading into
the Sunset: Solar and Wind Energy Get Five More Years of Tax Credits with a Phase-
Down, 47 TRENDS 9, 10 (2016).
4 Typically, a state RPS requires retailers of electric power within the state
to meet their supply obligations using a specified percentage (or, in some cases,
amount) of electricity from renewable sources. State Renewable Portfolio Standards
and Goals, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.ncsl.
org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/YS3Q-J32Z].
State RPSs vary widely: each defines “renewable energy” differently and establishes
different targets. For up-to-date information about state RPSs, see Database of State
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org [https://perma.cc/
NG56-2MGJ]. For fuller explanations of state RPSs and their operation, see generally
Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To
the Top”?, 3 SANDIEGO J. CLIMATECHANGE&ENERGY L. 3 (2011–2012).
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More recently, two additional trends have further
strengthened the decarbonization movement. First, coal-fired
power is facing unprecedented regulatory and market obstacles.
The shale gas revolution has ushered in an era of inexpensive
natural gas for the foreseeable future,5 cutting into coal’s market
share and causing cognitive dissonance among climate activists.6
Further damaging coal-fired power’s prospects are a group of
Obama administration EPA rules,7 the most important of which
address mercury8 and greenhouse gas emissions.9 Those rules
would force additional closures of coal-fired power plants,10 and
add compliance costs to natural gas-fired generators as well.11
The Trump administration has pledged to repeal the
greenhouse gas rule, though it would likely have to replace it,12
and several of the rules face legal challenges.13 Nevertheless,
5 Annual Energy Outlook 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
forecasts/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=14-AEO2015 [https://perma.cc/3MXH-P2AJ] (discussing
future natural gas prices).
6 Alison Ciaccio, Coal Is Losing the Battle for the U.S. Market—Badly,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-09/coal-is-
losing-the-battle-for-the-u-s-market-badly [https://perma.cc/25J5-FF3] (chronicling the
coal-fired generation’s decline).
7 For a summary of these rules, see David E. Adelman & David B. Spence,
Ideology vs. Interest Group Politics in U.S. Energy Policy, 95 N.C. L. REV. 339 (2017).
8 This rule is known as the “mercury and air toxics,” or “MATS” rule. See
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9306 (Feb. 16, 2012) (codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 63, subpart UUUUU).
9 EPA’s GHG regulation program is known as the Clean Power Plan, and
comprises a new rule establishing emissions standards for new fossil-fueled power plants,
as well as guidelines for the establishment of state standards regulating GHG emissions
from existing fossil-fueled plants. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64510, 64512 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60, subpart TTTT) (standards for new sources); see Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed.
Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (covering existing sources).
10 See Adelman & Spence, supra note 7, at 383–91 (using EPA data to project
the distribution of closures of coal-fired power plants in response to these rules).
11 See e.g., Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New,
Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35824 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (final rule requiring oil and gas producers to mitigate methane
leakage from their equipment and operations).
12 Tatiana Schlossberg, What to Know About Trump’s Order to Dismantle the
Clean Power Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/
science/what-to-know-about-trumps-order-to-dismantle-the-clean-power-plan.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/SBT3-23MU].
13 The Supreme Court struck down the MATS rule in Michigan v. EPA, 135
S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (holding that EPA’s conclusion that it need not consider costs in
determining whether regulating mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants was
inconsistent with the statute). On December 1, 2015, EPA reiterated its conclusion that
regulating mercury as a toxic pollutant is appropriate, this time after considering costs,
and signaled its intent to promulgate the rule. See Supplemental Finding that It Is
Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-
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any additional regulation of coal-fired power plant emissions
should make renewables at least marginally more competitive
against fossil-fueled generators in electricity markets over the
long term, all else equal. Second, a few states have begun to aim
even more directly and aggressively at rapidly decarbonizing their
energy sectors. Both California and Minnesota have enacted
aggressive low-carbon standards for their electricity sectors,14 and
New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) plan has
ambitions to decarbonize the New York energy mix by
emphasizing distributed energy resources (DER), such as rooftop
solar.15 All three states have aggressive near-term targets for
renewable energy growth.16 Furthermore, recent experience
integrating large amounts of wind power into the grid17 has fed
optimism about rapid and “deep” decarbonization. Many
proponents of the larger decarbonization project, including
prominent academics18 and environmental nongovernmental
Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 75025, 75026, 75027, 75028
(Dec. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). Twenty-seven states have challenged the
Clean Power Plan in court. Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Andrew M. Harris, Obama’s Clean
Power Plan Heads to Court: What to Know, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-23/obama-s-clean-power-plan-heads-to-
court-what-to-know [https://perma.cc/4UZE-ST6L]. The plaintiffs’ motion to stay the
effect of the rule pending their legal challenge was rejected by the D.C. Circuit in early
2016. Order at 2, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.
ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/Order%20granting%20expedition%20and%20
declining%20stay%20(M0116449xCECC6).pdf [https://perma.cc/462R-RV5H].
14 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 216H.02 (West 2007).
15 See Courtney Fairbrother & Dan Cross-Call, New York’s Plan to Reach 50
Percent Renewable Energy, GREENBIZ (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/
new-yorks-plan-reach-50-percent-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/8QW6-35G6].
16 For California RPS targets, see RPS Compliance & Reporting, CAL. PUB.
UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=3856 [https://perma.cc/WE6
W-PLJ2]. See MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINNESOTA RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD:
UTILITY COMPLIANCE 2–3 (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2015/
mandated/150096.pdf [https://perma.cc/U348-CVYM] (describing the Minnesota RPS
targets). For a good summary of the New York RPS, see History of the NYS Renewable
Portfolio Standard, NYSERDA, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/93
[https://perma.cc/5DTV-YVMQ ] (summarizing the New York RPS).
17 See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
18 See generally Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, Providing All Global
Energy with Wind, Water, and Solar Power, Part I: Technologies, Energy Resources,
Quantities and Areas of Infrastructure, and Materials, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1154 (2011)
(discussing the feasibility and characteristics of a system that would provide worldwide
energy entirely from wind, water, and sunlight) [hereinafter Jacobson & Delucchi, Part I];
Mark A. Delucchi & Mark Z. Jacobson, Providing All Global Energy with Wind, Water,
and Solar Power, Part II: Reliability, System and Transmission Costs, and Policies, 39
ENERGY POL’Y 1170 (2011) (suggesting that worldwide energy could be provided solely by
wind, water, and sunlight by 2030) [hereinafter Delucchi & Jacobson, Part II]; see also
RHYS ROTH, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE, REWIRING THE NORTHWEST’S
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: AN INTEGRATED VISION AND NEW INVESTMENT STRATEGY
(2016), https://evergreen.edu/sites/default/files/sustainableinfrastructure/docs/Energy-
Report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/YRL2-2NX4] (envisioning an electric grid running on
90% renewables by 2040); MATTHEW WRIGHT & PATRICK HEARPS, ZERO CARBON
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organizations (NGOs),19 believe that within the next thirty-five
years it will be possible to wean the electricity sector—entirely
or mostly—off of fossil-fueled generators. Some American
municipalities, such as Aspen, Colorado, and Burlington,
Vermont, seem to be proving this point by transitioning to “100
percent renewable energy,”20 while others have set explicit goals
to decarbonize by 2050.21
Only a few of these trends are reversible by the new
president. Coal-fired power seems likely to remain more
expensive than the alternatives, and the new administration has
relatively little leverage over most state energy policies. Even the
repeal of EPA rules is subject to statutory standards that may be
difficult to meet. The decarbonization task, then, seems
straightforward. First, continue to strengthen policies that
promote the development and use of renewable (or zero-carbon)
sources of electricity, particularly wind and solar power, and so-
called demand-response (DR).22 This direct approach implies
continuation or expansion of renewables’ tax credits, strengthening
state RPSs, requiring operators of wholesale power markets to
integrate wind, solar, and DR into electricity markets on
favorable terms,23 supporting state and local policies favorable to
renewable DERs, and spreading the aggressive decarbonization
policies of California,24 Minnesota, and New York (and Aspen
AUSTRALIA STATIONARY ENERGY PLAN, AUSTRALIAN SUSTAINABLE ENERGY (2011)
(offering a “10 year roadmap” to all-renewable electricity in Australia).
19 GREEN PEACE INT’L ET AL., ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION: A SUSTAINABLE WORLD
ENERGY OUTLOOK (4th ed. 2012); Club: No More Gas Fired Power Plants, SIERRA CLUB
ATL. CHAPTER (Jan. 19, 2016), https://atlantic2.sierraclub.org/content/club-no-more-gas-
fired-power-plants [https://perma.cc/5T8Y-2UT9].
20 Erica Robbie, Aspen Is Third U.S. City to Reach 100% Renewable Energy,
ASPEN TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.aspentimes.com/news/17972193-113/aspen-is-
third-us-city-to-reach-100 [https://perma.cc/BWE4-9BBD] (reporting on both Aspen’s and
Burlington’s all-renewables policies).
21 See, e.g., Gavin Bade, New York Assembly Approves Climate Bill to
Eliminate Greenhouse Gases, UTIL. DIVE (June 3, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/
news/new-york-assembly-approves-climate-bill-to-eliminate-greenhouse-gas-emissio/42
0315/ [https://perma.cc/VT9S-YJJH].
22 During high demand periods when reserve margins are constrained, DR can
be used to avoid peaks in demand and the sharp spikes in wholesale spot market prices
they cause. Because of the way electricity spot markets work, DR can have the effect of
reducing the amount that other sellers of power are paid for power they sell. For a fuller
explanation of spot market pricing, see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
23 Recent orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have
required just this. See Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 139 FERC ¶ 61,246 (June
22, 2012) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring grid operators to integrate wind and solar
generation on relatively favorable terms); Demand Response Compensation and Organized
Energy Markets, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring
grid operators to compensate providers of DR on relatively favorable terms).
24 California’s renewable energy plan comprises a suite of laws and regulatory
initiatives. See California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs, CAL. ENERGY
COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/ [https://perma.cc/2GVX-4WVX].
2017] PARADOXES OF “DECARBONIZATION” 451
and Burlington) to other locations. The second way to advance
the cause directly is to discourage the use of fossil fuels in
electricity generation. In the absence of a federal carbon tax or
cap-and-trade legislation, that means defending EPA rules that
disadvantage coal and natural gas, encouraging the spread of
state laws that limit carbon emissions, and opposing the
production and transportation of fossil fuels whenever possible.25
Unfortunately, however, encouraging the perpetual
substitution of renewables for fossil fuels creates unintended
consequences—paradoxes26—that stem in part from two
sometimes unavoidable and underappreciated truths. First,
despite recent advances in the cost of renewable energy
production and electricity storage,27 it remains true that the
three attributes society values in the electricity system—cost,
reliability, and environmental performance—remain in tension
with one another. Advancing any one value comes at the expense
of the others, and there are limits to the size of the cost increases
or reliability decreases the public will accept in order to improve
environmental performance. Second, most of the decisions about
which types of electric generators will be built, and how and
when existing generators will be used to serve demand, will not
be made or dictated by policymakers; rather, they will be made
by private sector actors guided by economic motives. Power
generation technologies compete continuously with one another
on price, and the market reacts to the injection of more
renewables into that competition in ways that may not always
strike the popular or intended balance between reliability, cost,
and environmental performance.
This article explores three sets of paradoxical
consequences of rapid, deep decarbonization that emanate from
these two truths. Part I describes the unique characteristics of
modern American electricity markets, which have become a
strange polyglot reflecting different regional choices about
reliance on market forces versus government regulation. Part
25 Most national environmental NGOs, including Sierra Club, NRDC, and the
Union of Concerned Scientists seem to be pursuing this strategy. See, e.g., Andrea
Issod, Setting the Record Straight About EPA’s Long Overdue Rule Eliminating Clean
Air Act Loopholes, SIERRA CLUB (Aug. 17, 2015), http://sierraclub.org/environmental
law/planet/2015/08/setting-record-straight-about-epa-s-long-overdue-rule-eliminating-
clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/6GH3-KAW5]; Brendan Pierson, Sierra Club Seeks to
Defend Calif. Emissions Limits, LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.law360.com/
energy/articles/159367/sierra-club-seeks-to-defend-calif-emissions-limits [https://perma.
cc/7S2S-SS6D].
26 I use the term “paradox” loosely here to refer to the fact that many of these
consequences are contrary to most people’s intuitions.
27 Björn Nykvist & Måns Nilsson, Rapidly Falling Costs of Battery Packs for
Electric Vehicles, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 329, 329 (2015).
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II details three paradoxes of deep decarbonization: (1) the
reliability-cost paradox, in which higher levels of clean,
inexpensive renewable energy generation beget steps necessary
to ensure system reliability, which beget both unintended
environmental consequences (in competitive markets) and a
feedback loop that exacerbates reliability and cost problems; (2)
the health paradox, which refers to the fact that policies that
discourage all fossil-fueled generation can be environmentally
counterproductive, because different fossil fuels have different
health and environmental consequences; and (3) the fairness
paradox which focuses on the relative costliness and potentially
regressive consequences of plans to use distributed generation as
a path to decarbonization. Part III concludes by recommending a
more realistic approach to decarbonization, one that is both more
transparent about—and sensitive to—cost and reliability
constraints. Because the three paradoxes imply that the shortest
(and surest) route to that destination may not be a straight
line, experts and policymakers ought to be more intellectually
honest about the difficult tradeoffs at the heart of this transition.
Policymakers do a disservice to the public when they deemphasize
the potential environmental, cost, and distributional effects of
their choices. That transparency, in turn, will raise the profile of
cost and reliability concerns in the decarbonization debate, and
may already be leading some policymakers to try to avoid some of
these effects by discouraging fossil-fueled and nuclear generators
from exiting the grid as renewable penetration levels increase.
I. MODERN AMERICAN ELECTRICITYMARKETS
Modern electricity markets look different today than they
looked for most of their existence. Since the 1990s, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has actively promoted
competition in wholesale power markets by requiring investor-
owned utilities (IOU) to open their transmission systems to
third-party users, and by urging IOUs to form regional markets
governed by Independent System Operators (ISO)28 and
28 FERC Order 888 encouraged utilities to join together to form ISOs to
manage the grid and the geographically broader markets that accompanied the move to
competition in wholesale electricity markets. See Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale
Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 75
FERC ¶ 61,080 (Apr. 24, 1996). Transmission owners retained ownership of their lines
when they joined the ISO, but relinquished control over their use (including pricing
and scheduling of transmission services) to the ISO. Id.
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Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO).29 Some IOUs did
so, but others did not; those in the Mountain West and
Southeast opted not to do so.30 At the same time, some states
have restructured their retail markets along similar lines,
offering consumers a choice of retail power suppliers.31
All this restructuring has left three basic market forms:
(1) hybrid markets, characterized by competition and market
pricing at the wholesale level, but with traditional public
utility commission (PUC) regulation of retail prices;32 (2)
traditional markets, in which vertically integrated utilities
continue to generate most of the power they sell to their retail
customers (obviating the need for a robust wholesale power
market) at a PUC-regulated rate; and (3) competitive markets,
characterized by market pricing and competition in both the
wholesale and retail markets. Despite the heterogeneity of U.S.
electricity markets, they share two common characteristics.
First, in all of these markets, private companies dominate the
provision of electric service: most generating facilities are built
with private capital by profit-seeking companies; and most
power is sold at retail by private, profit-seeking companies.33
Second, in all of these electricity-pricing regimes, the law
requires that rates be “just and reasonable” and
nondiscriminatory.34 Both of these truths have important
29 FERC’s Order 2000 established the parameters for creating regional
transmission organizations. See generally Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission
Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (Dec. 20, 1999). RTOs operate similarly to ISOs. FERC
originally hoped that RTOs would be much broader geographically such that the entire
country might be covered by as few as four RTOs. However, we now use the terms RTO and
ISO interchangeably. See FEDERALREGULATORYDIRECTORY: THEESSENTIALGUIDE TO THE
HISTORY, ORGANIZATION,AND IMPACT OFU.S. FEDERALREGULATION 180 (16th ed. 2014).
30 For a map of existing ISOs and RTOs (and, by implication, of places where
utilities declined to form ISOs or RTOs), see Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp [https://perma.cc/F7KM-9N6U]
(last updated Jan. 11, 2017).
31 See Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/
policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html [https://perma.cc/7RLN-48K2].
32 This kind of rate regulation establishes rates at a level from which the
utility retailer can recover its costs plus a fair return on any prudent investments in
capital made for the provision of electric service. See JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES ANDMATERIALS ch. 8 (4th ed. 2015).
33 For a basic description of electricity markets, see Electric Power Markets:
National Overview, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/market-
oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp [https://perma.cc/3QLF-SADL] (last updated Feb.
29, 2016).
34 See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012). State public utility laws
contain analogous requirements for retail rates. See e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.242(k)
(2009). For a discussion of how the just and reasonable standard is reconciled with
market pricing, see California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 383
F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) and La. Energy & Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 141 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (both approving market-based rates as
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implications for ongoing efforts to decarbonize American
electricity markets.
Most people prefer clean energy, but they also want
reliable, inexpensive energy, and each of us places our own
(varying) weights on those three central attributes of electric
service. Public utility law, however, has traditionally
emphasized cost and reliability in order to protect ratepayers
from suffering power outages or paying more than is necessary
for power.35 Consequently, one of the longstanding, bedrock
principles of grid management is that power plants should be
dispatched on a least-cost basis.36 As the next increment of
power is needed to satisfy additional demand, the grid operator
should dispatch power from the available generating facility
that can provide the needed power at the lowest marginal
cost.37 Grid operators deviate from this least-cost rule only to
ensure the security of the power system—that is, to avoid severe
congestion or other operational problems associated with
dispatching the least-cost unit.38 Thus, the grid operates on a
“security constrained economic dispatch” (SCED) rule39 that
prioritizes reliability first, costs second, and environmental
performance not at all.
This rule applies both in traditionally regulated systems
controlled by a single, vertically integrated IOU, and in
competitive, organized wholesale markets characterized by arms-
length sales between generators or wholesalers and retailers.40 In
most competitive spot markets (which tend to be those managed
by an RTO or ISO), sellers submit day-ahead bids indicating
the price at which they will be willing to sell power into the
system at various time increments the following day. Buyers do
the same, submitting bids representing the amount they are
consistent with the Federal Power Act). See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub.
Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 530 (2008) (declining to rule on the question posed in
the Lockyer and La. Energy cases).
35 The Federal Power Act and its state analogues require that prices be fair to
consumers—“just and reasonable,” in statutory parlance. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012). Grid
operators and courts alike have interpreted this requirement to imply least-cost dispatch.
For a discussion of the law governing the relationship between the just and reasonable
standard and the environmental costs of power, see Emily Hammond & David B. Spence,
The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 197–201 (2016).
36 Because we cannot (yet) store electricity in commercial quantities at an
acceptable cost, the amount of power dispatched to the grid must be kept in balance with
the amount being consumed off of the grid at all times.
37 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC
DISPATCH: DEFINITION, PRACTICES, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2006), http://www.
ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/joint-boards/final-cong-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR
8X-HGU6].
38 Id.
39 For a basic description of SCED, see id.
40 See id. at 5–6 (describing SCED’s general use in the industry).
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willing to pay for power during those same time increments.
For each time increment, the ISO or RTO matches buyers’ and
sellers’ bids and determines the market-clearing price, which all
sellers will receive for power dispatched to the system during
that time period.41 Theoretically, in a competitive market, sellers
should bid into the market at a price that reflects their marginal
cost of supplying power. In this way, the SCED rule tends to
push spot market prices toward the marginal cost of the market-
clearing plant.
This decision rule omits any consideration of the
environmental attributes of electric power, except in so far as
environmental regulation imposes compliance costs on
generators, thereby influencing bidding behavior.42 Alternatively,
one could incorporate a system of environmental dispatch,
including “adders” representing the external costs of generation,43
but grid operators do not because many consider it inconsistent
with their statutory mandate that rates be just and reasonable.44
A few states have experimented with rules requiring IOUs to
consider environmental attributes in decisions about which new
generation plants to build, or how to otherwise acquire
wholesale power.45 Management of the externalities of electricity
generation, however, is mostly left to environmental laws like
the Clean Air Act46 and the Clean Water Act.47 Because some
believe that environmental laws mandate levels of pollution
control that fall short of those necessary to maximize social net
benefits,48 the suite of federal, state, and municipal policies
41 For a brief primer on the operation of electricity spot markets, see Electricity
Primer—The Basics of Power and Competitive Markets, ELEC. POWER SUPPLY ASS’N,
http://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/%3Ffa=prices [https://perma.cc/BHA5-FKAW].
42 Though most of the costs of compliance fall on the capital expense side of
the ledger, pollution control equipment does entail some operating costs. WILLIAM M.
VATAVUK, ESTIMATING COSTS OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 23–30 (1991).
43 For a discussion of the literature on environmental dispatch and adders, see
Hammond & Spence, supra note 35, at 197–99, 214 (discussing adders and environmental
or full social cost dispatch).
44 The D.C. Circuit addressed this question peripherally in Grand Council of
the Crees v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 198 F.3d 950, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2000),
rejecting the claim that alleged environmental harm from a power project was in the
zone of interests by the statutory requirement that rates be just and reasonable. The
court described those interests as purely “economic,” noting that the Supreme Court has
never suggested they could or should “encompass considerations of environmental impact,”
and that the FERC has “affirmatively forsworn environmental considerations.” Id.
45 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 35, at 206–07.
46 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7661 (2012).
47 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
48 This is evident from the large, positive benefit-cost ratios associated with
additional regulations. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Michael A. Livermore &
Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1184, 1236–47 (2014) (illustrating that the benefits of rules establishing National
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designed to promote renewable energy may be understood as a
second best, supplemental way to reach that goal.
Regardless, the growth of renewable energy in the last
decade has been nothing short of astounding. Between 2001 and
2014, wind generation in the United States grew by a factor of
30, from about 6000 gigawatt-hours (gwh) to more than 181,600
gwh.49 Utility-scale solar generation grew steadily from 543 gwh,
in 2001, to about 1800 gwh in 2011.50 Since 2011, solar
generation has doubled annually.51 All of this growth has
occurred during a period in which electricity demand has been
relatively flat.52 As noted, rapid cost reductions have fed utility-
scale renewables growth,53 as have incentives like state RPSs
and federal tax credits.54 While nonhydro renewables still
comprise less than 10% of total generation, they sometimes
comprise much larger shares of the generation mix for discrete
periods of time. On December 20, 2015, wind power provided
45% of the electricity on the Texas system, a record high,55 and it
has supplied significant amounts of generation in other locations
for longer periods.56 Sizeable cost reductions in electricity
storage technology57 would further improve the prospects for
relying on renewables by addressing the intermittency problem;
those reductions may or may not be on the horizon.58 So-called
Ambient Air Quality Standards almost always exceed costs and establish standards
that fall short of the standard that maximizes net benefits).
49 See Electricity Data Browser, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.
gov/electricity/data/browser/ (data reports on file with author).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Katherine Tweed, U.S. Electricity Demand Flat Since 2007, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/environment/us-electricity-
demand-flat-since-2007 [https://perma.cc/4YVQ-9TGE].
53 According to the Solar Energy Industries Association, the average price of
solar generation per watt decreased from about $7.50 in 2009 to less than $3.00 in
2014. Solar Industry Data, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/research-
resources/solar-industry-data [https://perma.cc/VU5Z-THNS].
54 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
55 Robert Fares, Texas Sets All-Time Wind Energy Record, SCI. AM. (Jan. 14,
2016), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/texas-sets-new-all-time-wind-energy-
record/ [https://perma.cc/THF7-VL2Y].
56 American Wind Power Breezes Past 70-Gigawatt Milestone, AM. WIND
ENERGY ASS’N. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.awea.org/MediaCenter/pressrelease.aspx?
ItemNumber=8255 [https://perma.cc/93VG-VPLX].
57 Right now, storage is expensive. For estimates of the costs of various
storage technologies, see Siraj Sabihuddin et al., A Numerical and Graphical Review of
Energy Storage Technologies, 8 ENERGIES 172, 176, 184–85, 190, 197 (2015); Andreas
Poullikkas, A Comparative Overview of Large-Scale Battery Systems for Electricity
Storage, 27 RENEWABLE& SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 778, 786, tbl.6 (2013).
58 Theoretical and desktop breakthroughs in battery technology and cost have
proven stubbornly difficult to commercialize. See STEVE LEVINE, THE POWERHOUSE:
INSIDE THE INVENTION OF A BATTERY TO SAVE THE WORLD (2015) (recounting multiple
theoretical breakthroughs that could not be translated into commercial success).
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“behind the meter” options that would help address the
intermittency problem, like demand response and rooftop solar
generation, are already experiencing rapid growth.59 Consequently,
a few states now aim for much higher levels of wind and solar
penetration; New York, for example, aspires to secure 50% of its
electricity from renewables by 2030, and to phase out carbon
emissions by 2050.60 A 2016 resolution before the U.S. House of
Representatives supported a national policy aiming to reduce
carbon emissions from the electricity sector to zero.61 Some
prominent academics argue that it is possible for renewables
(wind, solar, and hydro) to supply 80%–100% of global energy
(or U.S. energy, or energy for individual states) by 2030.62
At first glance, the most direct route to this kind of
rapid, deep decarbonization seems to be the continuation and
extension of policies that encourage the construction of ever-more
renewable power, and discourage use of fossil fuels. Indeed,
proponents of this direct route to decarbonization scored victories
during the Obama administration, though some of those victories
seem to be in the crosshairs of the Trump administration.63 At the
national level, the Obama EPA’s Clean Power Plan,64 New
Source Performance Standards for fossil-fueled generators,65
59 See V.S.K. Murthy Balijepalli et al., Review of Demand Response Under Smart
Grid Paradigm 1 (2011), http://desismartgrid.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/review_of_
demand_response_vskmurthy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X8R-XYH6]; SOLAR ENERGY INDUS.
ASS’N, SOLARENERGY FACTS: Q2 2015 (2014), http://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/Q2%202
015%20SMI%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7L5-SQJF].
60 See Bade, supra note 21.
61 H.R. Res. 540, 114th Cong. (2015).
62 See generally Jacobson & Delucchi, Part I, supra note 18; Delucchi & Jacobson,
Part II, supra note 18; see also ROTH, supra note 18, at 4 (envisioning an electric grid
running on 90% renewables by 2040).
63 The Trump administration has pledged repeal of two key greenhouse gas
regulation rules and to “cancel” the Paris Agreement on climate change. See supra note 13
(regarding repeal of the Clean Power Plan and the Paris Agreement); Paul A. Eisenstein,
Trump Rolls Back Obama-Era Fuel Economy Standards, NBCNEWS (Mar. 16, 2017), http://
www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/trump-rolls-back-obama-era-fuel-economy-standards-n73
4256 [https://perma.cc/CUA6-Y5JS].
64 See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed.
Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, subpart TTTT) (standards for
new sources); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,566 (Oct. 23, 2015) (covering existing
sources) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. subpart. UUUU). The Clean Power Plan would mandate
significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil-fueled power plants.
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,510;
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,566.
65 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified,
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at
64,510 (standards for new sources); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,566. This rule
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mercury rule,66 cooling water rule,67 and a suite of several other
recent rules, aim to advance the cause of decarbonization. In
2015, Congress extended tax credits for solar energy until
2022, and for wind energy until 2019, as part of an omnibus
spending bill.68 In the states, defenders of RPSs have been
largely successful fending off attempts to repeal or weaken
RPSs by the American Legislative Exchange Council.69 At the
state and local levels, proponents of renewables have been
engaged in battles over “net metering,” the practice of crediting
rooftop solar owners at the full retail price for excess power
they generate and dispatch to the grid, so long as the owners
are not net sellers of power over a billing period.70 Despite
criticism that this practice forces the remaining grid users to
subsidize rooftop solar owners’ use of the grid,71 most states,
however, have retained net metering.72 Some state and local
governments have also sought to decarbonize by banning or
restricting oil and gas development in the wake of the
hydraulic fracturing boom, arguing that this combats climate
change because methane is a potent greenhouse gas that is
emitted from those operations.73
would require significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from new fossil-fueled
power plants.
66 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and
Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,300 (Aug. 15, 2014) (codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125). The mercury rule would require significant reductions in mercury
and other toxic air emissions from coal-fired power plants, and is projected to lead to the
retirement of some plants.
67 42 U.S.C. § 7429 (2012). This rule would limit cooling water use by power
plants, including fossil-fueled plants.
68 See generally Chris Nelder & Mark Silberg, Congress Extends the
Renewable Investment Tax Credit: What Now, GREENBIZ (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.
greenbiz.com/article/congress-extends-renewable-investment-tax-credit-what-now [https://
perma.cc/N742-C7TV].
69 See, e.g., Samantha Page, The Tide Is Turning Against ALEC in the
Renewable Energy Battle, THINK PROGRESS (June 5, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/
climate/2015/06/05/3661566/alecs-rps-battleground/ [https://perma.cc/V9ZC-MY2M].
70 Kevin Karges, Net Metering: Do Non-Solar Homeowners and Utility
Companies Have a Legitimate Gripe?, ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1017, 1021 (2014), http://
www.ajelp.com/wp-content/uploads/Karges11.pdf [https://perma.cc/32NB-YTNY].
71 In principle, demand response programs that reward customers for reducing
demand at peak periods raise the same problem, at least in hybrid and traditional
jurisdictions. This problem of covering the fixed costs of the grid as more customers consume
less power is sometimes referred to as the “utility death spiral.” Id. The state of Nevada has
adopted an additional demand charge to be paid by rooftop solar owners to cover the cost of
reliance on the grid. SeeNEV. ADMIN. CODE § 701B.130 (2014).
72 For the Solar Energy Industry Association’s tracking of state net-metering
policies, see Issues & Policies, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/
distributed-solar/net-metering [https://perma.cc/7SWA-AZN4].
73 New York and Vermont have banned fracking, and Maryland has placed a
temporary moratorium on the practice. States Take Wait and See Approach on Fracking
Regulation, CONGRESS.ORG (July 9, 2015), http://congress.org/2015/07/09/states-take-wait-
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Thus, electricity markets are changing rapidly, and the
push toward greener electricity is being driven by a combination
of market forces and public policies. Often those policies seek
simply to promote renewable generation and to discourage
traditional (particularly fossil-fueled) generation. That simple,
direct route to decarbonization, however, may not necessarily
produce a cleaner generation mix, and it may yield other
consequences that voters and policymakers would prefer to avoid.
Those unintended consequences are explored in the next section.
II. PARADOXES OFDECARBONIZATION
This section explores three ways in which this direct and
rapid route to deep decarbonization creates paradoxical outcomes
tied respectively, to (1) the tradeoff between decarbonization, on
the one hand, and reliability and cost, on the other; (2) the
differential health and environmental impacts associated with
using renewables to displace coal versus natural gas in the
electric generation mix; and (3) the distributional inequities that
can arise from the way policy incentives for distributed
renewables are structured in most jurisdictions. Significantly, the
path toward decarbonization may be smoothed by policies that
grapple directly with these paradoxes, and that recognize the
need to incentivize investment in generation and storage
technologies that can support renewable power—a subject
explored more fully in Part III.
A. The Reliability-Cost Paradox(es)
Because wind and solar power are intermittent resources,
their penetration of the market at very high levels will eventually
exacerbate the demand for backup capacity, posing reliability and
cost challenges for the grid. As noted above, grid operators have
integrated wind generation over increasing stretches of time
without too much difficulty and without jeopardizing reliability.74
It does not follow, however, that further progress toward one
hundred percent renewables will not undermine cherished cost
and reliability goals, or that such a linear progression will trigger
a corresponding linear decrease in carbon or other pollution
and-see-approach-on-fracking-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/PJJ2-XAK2]. Hundreds of local
communities have banned the practice as well. Id. For a good summary of the role of
methane as a greenhouse gas, see Overview Of Greenhouse Gases: Methane Emissions, EPA,
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html [https://perma.cc/MHF
3-JTX4].
74 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
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emissions. It should be evident, for example, that in the absence
of clean storage technology, municipalities like Burlington,
Vermont, and Aspen, Colorado, that claim to have “gone 100
percent renewable,” do not actually consume only wind and solar
power.75 Undoubtedly, both cities consume some power from the
grid at times when renewable generators are not generating
power in amounts necessary to satisfy their demand. What those
cities do to support the “100 percent” claim is to either (1)
generate renewable power for the grid in amounts equal to their
consumption levels, or (2) purchase renewable energy credits
representing their consumptions levels—compensating renewable
generators for power actually generated and dispatched to the
grid somewhere at some time.76 As more cities emulate Aspen and
Burlington, bringing very high levels of renewable energy into the
system, the reliability imperative will trigger a number of
unintended consequences.
1. The Reliability Imperative Limits Environmental
Gains
The Federal Power Act, which establishes the regulatory
standards FERC applies to manage transmission and wholesale
power markets, requires that the grid accommodate increasing
penetration of intermittent resources in ways that prioritize
energy security and cost.77 As described above, market pricing and
SCED dispatch make those decisions very sensitive to changes in
each generator’s relative marginal costs, including relative fuel
costs.78 For fossil fuels, the continuous race to reduce costs means
that, for traditional technologies, relative marginal costs are
changing all the time. According to the Energy Information
Administration, the variable costs of coal-fired power remain close
to those of natural gas-fired power, despite the unprecedentedly
low price of American natural gas in the wake of the shale
revolution.79 As Figure 1 demonstrates, our historical reliance on
coal-fired generation is closely tied to the price of coal relative
75 Wilson Ring, 100% of Power for Vermont City Now Renewable, BOS. GLOBE
(Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/09/14/vermont-milestone-green-
energy-efforts/fsLHJl4eoqv6QoFNewRYBK/story.html [https://perma.cc/MA4G-9XYS]
(confirming that “all renewable” does not mean that all the power consumed by the city
comes from renewable sources).
76 Id.
77 See supra note 35 for an explanation of the legal origins of this requirement.
78 See supra Part I.
79 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED
COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015, at 6
tbl.1 (2015), https://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo15/pdf/electricity_generation_2015.
pdf [https://perma.cc/FA4N-YFWB].
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to gas. The ratio of the price of coal to the price of gas (on a per-
Btu basis) fell between 1981 and 1988, and coal’s market share
grew; the relative price climbed from 2005 to its highest level
in many decades in 2012, and coal’s share of the electric
generation market fell to unprecedented levels in the modern
era.80 The shale revolution did indeed drive down coal’s relative
position in the generation mix, but it retains a major share of
that mix for the time being. Wind and solar have no fuel costs;
the marginal cost of dispatching a kilowatt-hour of renewable
electricity is zero, or negative when that kilowatt-hour
generates a revenue under the production tax credit.81 Thus,
these technologies are dispatched whenever the wind is
blowing or the sun is shining, displacing other types of electric
generation in the dispatch order. At the same time, this
dynamic increases the demand for ancillary services—backup
generation ready to dispatch power on very short notice if the
wind stops blowing or the sun stops shining.
FIGURE 1. Share of U.S. Electric Utility Generation by Fuel,
1981–2014 (%)82
80 Gordon Pickering et al., The Phenomenon of Coal-to-Gas Switching,
WESTERN ENERGY, Fall 2012, http://digital.apogee-mg.com/article/The_Phenomenon_
Of_Coal-To-Gas_Switching/1241762/135766/article.html [https://perma.cc/9CK5-9JA5].
81 Daniel Gross, The Night They Drove the Price of Electricity Down, SLATE
(Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_juice/2015/09/texas_
electricity_goes_negative_wind_power_was_so_plentiful_one_night_that.html [https://
perma.cc/7YDB-9YU3].
82 See Electric Power Monthly, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 23, 2016),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_2 [https://perma.
cc/D8LB-LJUD].
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The environmental impacts of increasing reliance on
wind (and solar) power, then, are partly a function of the
resources used to back up wind (and solar) power. If a coal-fired
generator is called upon to provide “spinning reserves”83 in
anticipation of a sudden decline in wind generation, that coal-
fired facility is burning fuel (and generating pollution) even
though it is not dispatching power to the grid. The generator may
also be required to ramp up and down in response to fluctuations
in wind or solar generation; because coal-fired plants were not
designed to ramp efficiently, ramping generates more pollution
per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated.84 This means that
displacement of 20% of what would otherwise be coal-fired
generation does not translate to a 20% reduction in emissions
from coal-fired power plants. The National Renewable Energy
Laboratory has estimated that 20% penetration of wind produces
pollution reductions of only a few percentage points in the eastern
grid,85 and slightly more in the western grid.86 As noted above,
coal faces other regulatory pressures that are causing it to exit
the system, but a great deal of coal-fired capacity remains.
The cleaner the source of backup power, then, the better.
Theoretically, hydroelectric power operated in storage mode87
could provide a renewable storage solution, which is how
83 “Spinning reserves” are generation sources that are up and running (e.g.,
burning fuel) and ready to dispatch power to the grid on short notice but are not yet
doing so. Spinning Reserve, ENERGY STORAGE ASS’N, http://energystorage.org/energy-
storage/technology-applications/spinning-reserve [https://perma.cc/P4E8-KR34].
84 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, MANAGING LARGE-SCALE PENETRATION OF
INTERMITTENT RENEWABLES 26–27 (2011), http://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2012/03/MITEI-RP-2011-001.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XGU-CQ2V] (describing cycling and
ramping); Wind Integration: Does It Reduce Pollution and Greenhouse Gas Emissions?,
INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (June 23, 2010), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/
analysis/wind-integration-does-it-reduce-pollution-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions/ [https://
perma.cc/STJ8-UPEK] (explaining how ramping coal-fired plants emits more pollution).
85 See ENERNEX CORP., EASTERN WIND INTEGRATION & TRANSMISSION STUDY:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND PROJECT OVERVIEW 27 (2011), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11o
sti/47086.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DGH-YQ84].
86 GE ENERGY, WESTERNWIND AND SOLAR INTEGRATION STUDY ES-14–ES-15
(2010), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47434.pdf [https://perma.cc/F283-5N2V]; BENTEK
ENERGY LLC, HOW LESS BECAME MORE . . . WIND, POWER AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES IN THE COLORADO ENERGY MARKET 8–9 (2010), https://docs.wind-watch.
org/BENTEK-How-Less-Became-More.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD6W-66VB].
87 For conventional hydroelectric facilities—those in which a river is dammed to
divert water through turbines—the term “storage mode” refers to the collection of water
in the reservoir behind a dam for diversion through the hydrostation’s turbines later,
when the power is needed. Alternatively, one could store hydroelectric energy using a
pumped storage project, which requires pumping water from a lake or river to an elevated
reservoir when electricity supply exceeds demand, and running the water back down to
lower elevations through turbines to generate electricity when electricity is scarce. For
information about the operation of pumped storage projects, see Sabihuddin et al., supra
note 57, at 177–78.
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hydropower is used in northern Europe.88 There are, however, a
limited number of projects and project sites in the United
States—but certainly not enough to provide enough system back-
up for an all renewables grid.89 Moreover, using hydropower as
storage would require a change in the way most existing U.S.
hydroelectric facilities are operated, one that would attract
significant environmental opposition. To support renewables,
hydrostations would need to allow water to collect behind the dam
when renewables are generating, and draw down the reservoir by
running water through the turbines when renewables are not
generating. The FERC, which licenses hydroelectric projects,
requires most operators to maintain hydrodam reservoirs at a
constant level so as to avoid the environmental damage to the
reservoir ecosystem associated with allowing the reservoir level to
rise and fall.90 Barring strong environmental opposition, the
FERC could instead sanction the construction of new pumped
storage hydroelectric projects,91 but the question remains whether
the financial prospects for such facilities (generating power only
when wind and solar cannot) are sufficiently bright to induce
prospective investors to build them.
Nuclear power is a very reliable zero-carbon option, but
one not well suited to support intermittent resources like wind
and solar. Existing nuclear power plants do not ramp up and
down quickly and efficiently,92 and newer systems that could be
used to do so seem prohibitively expensive, at least in
competitive electricity markets.93 Nor is DR likely to be able to
88 See EURELECTRIC, HYDRO IN EUROPE: POWERING RENEWABLES 7–8 (2011),
http://www.eurelectric.org/media/26690/hydro_report_final-2011-160-0011-01-e.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7CNN-AGD3] (describing how European hydro stations are operated in storage
mode to support intermittent generation and to follow variations in load).
89 DOUGLAS G. HALL & RANDY D. LEE, IDAHO NAT’L LAB., ASSESSMENT OF
OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW UNITED STATES PUMPED STORAGE HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS
USING EXISTING WATER FEATURES AS AUXILIARY RESERVOIRS (2014), http://hydropower.
inel.gov/resourceassessment/d/pumped-storage-hydro-assessment-report-published-version-
20mar14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ES8-GHPQ] (summarizing the untapped storage potential
in the United States and discussing barriers to its development).
90 ROCÍO URÍA-MARTÍNEZ ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2014 HYDROPOWER
MARKET REPORT 30 (2015), http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/04/f22/2014%20
Hydropower%20Market%20Report_20150424.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9J7-Q947] (“For the
most part, new projects will be operated as run-of-river, with limited flexibility.”).
91 See generally Pumped Storage Projects, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pump-storage.asp [https://
perma.cc/8QYY-G9RX] (last updated Apr. 18, 2016) (describing the functionality and
capabilities of pumped storage projects and noting that the FERC has approved twenty-
four pumped storage projects).
92 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 84, at 11 (describing the cycling
and ramping rates for various technologies).
93 See Peter Taberner, Licensing Process to Catapult US-SMR Export
Potential, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2015), http://analysis.nuclearenergy
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provide all or most of the necessary ancillary services in an all-
renewables future. The RTO offering the most generous terms
for DR participation in wholesale markets is PJM,94 and DR
comprises only a relatively small percentage of the PJM capacity
market.95 Dynamic retail pricing, in which retail rates vary
moment-to-moment with wholesale spot market rates, might
produce larger reductions in demand when power is scarce and
might offer a cleaner solution to the problem of sudden losses of
renewable generation; however, retailers have not been
particularly eager to offer dynamic retail rates to their customers,
perhaps because they believe customers do not want to face the
price risk associated with dynamic rates.96
Finally, the environmental impacts of renewables
penetration vary by region. California and the Northeast rely very
little on coal-fired power.97 In these regions, the ancillary services
used to back up wind or solar power will likely come mostly from
natural gas-fired plants. The rest of the country relies more
heavily on coal; therefore, coal-fired plants may be required to
back up wind and solar at times. If even weakened versions of the
EPA’s Clean Power Plan and mercury rule survive judicial
challenge and the Trump administration,98 we can expect reliance
on coal-fired power to continue to decline further. As long as some
coal-fired plants remain cost-competitive—or are deemed
necessary by grid operators to ensure the reliability of the
system—coal-fired power will remain a part of the energy mix.
2. Renewables, Price, and Long-Term Reliability
Higher levels of renewables penetration can create
perverse long-run incentives as well, complicating planners’
efforts to ensure long-term system reliability. The increasing
participation of zero-marginal-cost sources in wholesale spot
insider.com/small-modular-reactors/licensing-process-catapult-us-smr-export-potential
[https://perma.cc/2Y2L-SGL5].
94 PJM, which once stood for “Pennsylvania,” New “Jersey,” and “Maryland,”
now covers most of the Middle Atlantic region and significant portions of the Midwest.
95 See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE
& ADVANCED METERING: STAFF REPORT 12 tbl.3-3 (2015), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/2015/demand-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN2G-S2XJ].
96 For a discussion of these issues, see Ahmad Faruqui & Jennifer Palmer,
Dynamic Pricing and Its Discontents, REGULATION, Fall 2011, at 16, https://object.cato.
org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/9/regv34n3-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SD
G-ECBA].
97 This conclusion comes from a review of state energy profile data assembled
by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, see U.S. States: State Profiles and
Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/state/ [https://perma.
cc/P27C-HT8U].
98 See supra note 13 for a description of litigation challenging these rules.
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markets depresses spot prices, thereby reducing long-run
returns to all sellers in the market. In traditional markets this
is not much of a problem because integrated IOUs are assured
of earning a fair return on their prudent investments in
generation—even on a seldom-used natural gas-fired power
plant, for example. In hybrid and competitive markets, however,
generators must earn their returns by selling power to actual
customers. As spot prices decline, the possibility of earning a
reasonable return on investment decreases for increasing
numbers of generators. Obviously, this phenomenon discourages
investment in new generation, which can eventually jeopardize
system reliability—a phenomenon known as the “missing
money” problem.99 This problem of attracting private capital lies
at the heart of public utility regulation,100 and hangs like a
shadow over hybrid and competitive markets.
Table 1 summarizes the two prominent annual estimates
of the “levelized costs of energy” (LCOE) for new plants by
generation technology. The LCOE represents the per-megawatt-
hour (mwh) price for power that each plant must earn over its
lifetime to remain profitable and so can be seen as an estimate
of the plant’s long-run average costs. It is evident from the table
that new utility-scale renewables enjoy cost advantages over
most other new generation technologies, advantages that are
enhanced by subsidies like tax credits and feed-in tariffs.101
Those advantages are multiplied by state RPSs that ensure a
market for renewable power (though not for any particular wind
or solar generator). Even with these advantages, however, most
utility-scale renewables are built only after the execution of a
power purchase agreement guaranteeing a stream of revenue to
the plant over the long term.102
99 See PETER CRAMTON & STEVEN STOFT, THE CONVERGENCE OF MARKET
DESIGNS FOR ADEQUATE GENERATING CAPACITY 8–11 (2006), http://www.cramton.umd.edu/
papers2005-2009/cramton-stoft-market-design-for-resource-adequacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/V
6JJ-SLR7] (describing the missing money problem); WILLIAM W. HOGAN, CTR. FOR BUS. &
GOV’T, ON AN “ENERGYONLY” ELECTRICITYMARKETDESIGN FOR RESOURCE ADEQUACY 5–8
(2005) (explaining an idealized energy-only model).
100 For a description of how and why this problem loomed large in the crafting
of the earliest public utility laws, see William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon
Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1642–43 (2014).
101 Very few U.S. states have enacted feed-in tariffs, which act as a subsidy by
guaranteeing a minimum rate for the sale of power from renewable generators. For an
example of a feed-in tariff statute, see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.32 (West 2016).
102 See Stephen L. Teichler & Ilia Levitine, Long-Term Power Purchase
Agreements in a Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 706
(2005) (describing long-term PPAs as “an integral element of competitive power
markets and restructured power industries” and arguing that they should account for
future changes that may occur).
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TABLE 1. Levelized Cost of Energy Estimates, U.S. Energy
Information Administration103 and Lazard,104 ($/mwh)
EIA (point
estimate)
Lazard
(range)
Coal 95 65–150
Natural Gas—Combined
Cycle 75 52–78
Nuclear 95 97–136
Hydroelectric 83
Wind (onshore) 73 32–77
Solar PV (average) 125
Solar PV—rooftop 184–300
Solar PV—utility scale 58–70
Traditional generators not covered by state RPSs or other
direct subsidies must find their own customers in hybrid and
competitive markets. Absent some sort of market intervention to
provide generators with additional returns, the missing money
problem can cause underinvestment in generating capacity,
jeopardizing future reliability.105 States and RTOs/ISOs have
103 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., WIND AND SOLAR DATA AND PROJECTIONS FROM
THE U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: PAST PERFORMANCE AND ONGOING
ENHANCEMENTS (2016), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/supplement/renewable/pdf/
projections.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4HH-JDXC].
104 LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 9.0, at 13–
14 (2015), https://www.lazard.com/media/2390/lazards-levelized-cost-of-energy-analysis-90.
pdf [https://perma.cc/LUJ8-WAX5].
105 There are many explanations for potential underinvestment in generation.
Investors may be risk averse or may be averse to uncertainty, thereby causing them to
decline to make an investment with a positive expected value because of the error bars
around the expected value point estimate. Investors may believe that the option value
of delaying investment exceeds the value of investing. Market prices may not reflect
the option value of having standby generation. As more zero-marginal-cost renewables
enter the market, investors may project that the long-run spot prices (based upon
marginal costs) may fall below the LCOE of any plant. All of these considerations could
be at work deterring investment. See PETER CRAMTON& STEVE STOFT, THE CONVERGENCE
OF MARKET DESIGNS FOR ADEQUATE GENERATING CAPACITY: A WHITE PAPER FOR THE
CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY OVERSIGHT BOARD 8–11 (2006), http://www.cramton.umd.edu/
papers2005-2009/cramton-stoft-market-design-for-resource-adequacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/7
5B7-E3NT] (describing the missing money problem); William W. Hogan, On an “Energy
Only” Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy 6–8 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of
Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Sept. 23, 2005) (explaining the idealized energy-only model); Paul
L. Joskow, Capacity Payments in Imperfect Electricity Markets: Need and Design, 16
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sought to reduce that risk by intervening in hybrid and
competitive markets to ensure a fair return on investment for
plant owners in a variety of ways. For example, several large
RTOs/ISOs run “capacity markets,” auctions through which
generators agree to make capacity available to meet reserve
targets in the future, for a price.106 By contrast, the ERCOT region
in Texas is experimenting with changes to its ancillary services
markets that would operate much like a very short-term capacity
market.107 Some grid operators use less systematic methods of
achieving the same result, executing so-called “reliability must
run” (RMR) contracts with individual generators under which
the grid operator pays the generator to be available to provide
power to the system when called upon to do so.108 In 2016, Ohio
tried to contract with owners of coal-fired power plants to ensure
their continued availability in the future, but backed away from
those arrangements after the FERC objected that they would
distort prices on wholesale power markets.109 Nonetheless,
Illinois and New York have considered similar arrangements to
extend the useful life of nuclear power plants in those states.110
These policies represent reactions to the inability of real-
world competitive markets to induce sufficient investment to
ensure reliability, or to ensure it to the degree that policymakers
desire. As more renewables penetrate the market, they drive
down spot market prices and exacerbate this problem, triggering
the need for more administrative intervention into the market
for new supply.
UTIL. POL’Y 159 (2008) (arguing that the missing money problem can never be fully
ameliorated, even with freely floating prices).
106 For a discussion of capacity markets and other interventions designed to
alleviate the missing money problem, see David B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92
NOTREDAME L. REV. 973 (2017).
107 See Project 40000, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.puc.texas.gov/
industry/projects/electric/40000/40000.aspx [https://perma.cc/UE2N-V994] (providing
information and documents).
108 Several RTOs use these sorts of contracts to ensure the availability of resources
in reserve and to address potential market power problems by other generators. For an
example of a model RMR contract, see ERCOT Nodal Protocols Section 22 Attachment B:
Standard Form Reliability Must-Run Agreement (2015), http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/
current_guides/53528/22B_040115_Nodal.doc [https://perma.cc/2WGB-7NHD].
109 Jonathan Crawford, AEP, FirstEnergy Face U.S. Review of Ohio Power
Plant Contracts, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20
16-04-27/aep-firstenergy-face-u-s-review-of-ohio-power-plant-contracts [https://perma.cc/7
UPA-BN4H].
110 See Rebecca Smith, Exelon Moves to Close Two Illinois Nuclear Plants,
WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/exelon-moves-to-close-two-illinois-
nuclear-plants-1464873850 [https://perma.cc/56WR-JEC8]; Robert Walton, NY Gov. Cuomo:
State Will Fight Entergy Plans to Shutter FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant, UTIL. DIVE (Nov.
5, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ny-gov-cuomo-state-will-fight-entergy-plans-
to-shutter-fitzpatrick-nuclea/408667/ [https://perma.cc/53N7-UFWN].
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3. The Reliability Imperative Requires Overbuilding
The most aggressive plans for rapid, deep decarbonization
seem to minimize the importance of the reliability and cost
tradeoffs they will trigger. One of the more prominent plans is
that advocated by Stanford University’s Mark Jacobson, who
argues that the obstacles to an all-renewables grid “are social
and political, [but] not . . . economic.”111 But if electricity
storage remains prohibitively expensive,112 then the amount of
wind, solar, and hydro necessary to satisfy baseload electricity
demand will be enormous, for several reasons. First, because
the capacity factors of wind and solar are much lower than
those associated with dispatchable resources, it is necessary to
build much more renewable (rather than traditional) capacity
in order to serve any given amount of instantaneous demand.113
For simplicity, assume a system consisting entirely of wind
farms operating in four zones, and intermittency limits the
capacity factors of individual wind generators to 25%. That
means that at any single point in time, on average, the wind is
not blowing in three of the four zones. Therefore, generating
capacity in any one zone must be sufficient to serve demand in
all four zones. By contrast, fossil-fueled and nuclear generators
have capacity factors that can exceed 90%, and so would
require much less capacity to serve that same instantaneous
level of demand. Second, capacity factors are averages, and
there is variation around those averages. This means that even
with four-times capacity in our wind-only system, there will be
times when the wind is not blowing in any of the four wind
production zones. This implies that an all-renewables system
must be geographically broader, with even more redundant
111 Mark Jacobson: Barriers to 100% Clean Energy Are Social and Political,
Not Technical or Economic, ECOWATCH (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.ecowatch.com/mark-
jacobson-barriers-to-100-clean-energy-are-social-and-political-no-1882122292.html [https://
perma.cc/4Q2A-36MR]. The writer of this article explains that the dollar value of the
benefits of reducing pollution from fossil fuel combustion will exceed the out-of-pocket
costs of an all-renewables grid. Id. However, this argument sidesteps the question of how
to induce holders of investment capital to invest in the all-renewables grid.
112 Lazard published its first ever estimates of the levelized costs of storage in
2015, finding all forms of storage to be more expensive than gas-fired peaker plants.
See LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF STORAGE ANALYSIS—VERSION 1.0, at 9, 18
(2015), https://www.lazard.com/media/2391/lazards-levelized-cost-of-storage-analysis-10.
pdf [https://perma.cc/85UT-7LEJ].
113 See Ted Trainer, A Critique of Jacobson and Delucchi’s Proposals for a World
Renewable Energy Supply, 44 ENERGY POL’Y 476 (2012) (discussing the need for “large
scale redundancy” in an majority renewables systems); Nathaniel Gilbraith et al.,
Comments on Jacobson et al.’s Proposal for a Wind, Water and Solar Energy Future for
New York State, 60 ENERGY POL’Y 68 (2013) (alleging that rapid, deep decarbonization
scenarios fail to address whether an all-renewables system “could reliably meet
instantaneous electrical demand . . . throughout the year”).
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systems (supported by expensive new transmission networks),
to continue to meet existing high standards of reliability.114
Thus, while LCOE estimates capture the relative cost of
providing power from more generators representing a larger
total capacity, such estimates may not fully capture the
transmission costs of a disbursed system, the need for redundant
generation to provide energy storage, or the political obstacles to
building a bigger system. Such a system requires many more
transmission lines, and additional generation devoted entirely to
charging batteries or other storage devices to ensure a reliable
electricity supply.115 Will ratepayers be willing to fund the
construction of a system with that much additional capacity?
One scholar estimates that the costs of redundancy would be ten
times the cost of the existing system.116 One rejoinder to the cost
problem is that the costs of the current system exclude the
externalities associated with fossil fuel generation.117 In
assessing the welfare effects of different energy systems, this
rejoinder is correct, though most estimates of the cost of
pollution externalities associated with electricity generation fall
well short of the magnitudes associated with building an all-
renewables system.118 Welfare effects aside, however, the more
practical question is whether private capital will be willing to
invest in such a system. Unless—and until—an omniscient
planner or an optimal pollution tax internalizes the externalities
of fossil-fueled generation in the price of electricity, the
prospects for attracting sufficient capital to support an all-
renewables grid seem dim at best.
What if the market were to experience a technological
great leap forward, such that the price of renewables plus
114 Trainer calls this the “general variability problem.” Trainer, supra note
113, at 476–77; see also Ted Trainer, 100% Renewable Supply? Comments on the Reply
by Jacobson and Delucchi to the Critique by Trainer, 57 ENERGY POL’Y 634, 636 (2013)
(“[T]he capital cost of building enough turbines at all the places where the wind might
be strong when it is not blowing anywhere else would be unaffordable.”).
115 See Trainer, supra note 113 for a discussion of system redundancy.
116 Trainer, supra note 114, at 638. Based on data from California and Germany,
J.P. Morgan estimates the costs at less than two times the cost of the existing system,
excluding transmission investment. J.P. MORGAN, A BRAVE NEW WORLD: DEEP DE-
CARBONIZATION OF ELECTRICITY GRIDS 1–2 (2015), https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320
687247153.pdf [https://perma.cc/X35W-BBFW].
117 See Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, Response to Trainer’s Second
Commentary on a Plan to Power the World with Wind, Water, and Solar Power, 57
ENERGY POL’Y 641, 641 (2013), http://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/1
3-2ndRespEnergyPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/84Q8-MBZ4] (“[T]he annualized social cost
of a system that reliably delivers electricity is the relevant metric for comparing energy
systems rather than the capital cost alone.”). For estimates of the social costs of fossil
generation, see infra Section II.B.
118 See infra Section II.B for an estimate of the cost impacts of fossil fuel
generation.
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storage drops sharply enough that each is comparable to
traditional generation alternatives? That would still not
completely solve the cost-redundancy problem. That is, even
with economical storage options, wind and solar facilities would
still need to produce enough power to satisfy current demand
(while the wind is blowing and the sun is shining) and to
charge batteries or other storage devices that would be used to
satisfy demand later, when renewable power is unavailable. An
all-renewables system will be more expensive than traditional
generation because it will require more backup power (from
storage), and because the LCOE of storage exceeds the LCOE
of traditional, more reliable generation technologies.119 It seems
unlikely that either the market or mandates will produce
enough storage to achieve the requisite reliability standards in
an all-renewables grid, suggesting the need for backup power
from dispatchable resources.
That is why even with geographic breadth and system
redundancy, most deep decarbonization proposals recognize a
continuing need for dispatchable resources on the system to
kick in during those rare periods when renewables cannot serve
demand.120 One leading proposal contemplates the continued
existence of large amounts of natural gas-fired generation on the
all-renewables grid that would almost never be used.121 That
acknowledgment begs the question: who will own and build
natural gas-fired power plants that will almost never be used?
In a system that depends upon private capital to fund energy
infrastructure, it is naïve to expect investors to pay for the
pipelines that supply natural gas to those rarely used plants, or
to build the hydrostations that are to be operated only as
backups for wind and solar. Nor can we expect private
investment in other dispatchable resources, like nuclear power
stations.122 Will the government provide this service if the market
119 See LAZARD, supra note 112.
120 In its 2015 analysis of deep decarbonization of the electric grid, J.P.
Morgan’s first major conclusion was:
A critical part of any analysis of high-renewable systems is the cost of backup
thermal power and/or storage needed to meet demand during periods of low
renewable generation. . . . [A]s a result, levelized costs of wind and solar are not
the right tools to use in assessing the total cost of a high-renewable system.
J.P. MORGAN, supra note 116, at 1.
121 See, e.g., Elaine K. Hart & Mark Z. Jacobson, A Monte Carlo Approach to
Generator Portfolio Planning and Carbon Emissions Assessments of Systems with
Large Penetrations of Variable Renewables, 36 RENEWABLE ENERGY 2778, 2788 (2011)
(“The low carbon systems described in this study require very large capacities of
dispatchable generation with very low capacity factors.”).
122 The J.P. Morgan analysis concluded that despite the relative costliness of
nuclear power today, grids that retain 35% nuclear power to complement renewables
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will not? If not, we might anticipate that the existing coal-fired
power plants that remain on the system may be dispatched to
backup wind and solar under the SCED rule, rather than more
expensive DR or hydro.
In sum, rapid, deep decarbonization plans seem to
overlook or downplay their reliability and cost consequences,
and those consequences, in turn, can reduce the environmental
benefits of the plans (depending on which technologies are used
to support intermittent renewable resources). Rapid, deep
decarbonization requires the political will to intervene in
electricity markets in ways that preempt the SCED rule, and
that impose significant costs on ratepayers to ensure the
reliability of the electric system. The political will to do so could
develop, but it does not seem imminent.
B. The Health Paradox
A second paradox of decarbonization stems from its
proponents’ focus on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
climate change, and the corresponding failure to distinguish
between GHGs and the other byproducts of fossil fuel combustion.
As Table 2 indicates, all fossil fuel combustion is not alike.
Rather, there is an important distinction to be made between
decarbonization, on the one hand, and protecting health and the
environment, on the other.
TABLE 2. Pollution Rates, Coal- and Gas-Fired Power Plants
(lbs/billion Btu)123
Nitrogen
Oxides
Sulfur
Dioxide
Fine
Particles Mercury
Carbon
Dioxide
Coal 457 2,591 2,744 0.016 208,000
Natural
Gas 92 0.6 7 0 117,000
If one’s focus is exclusively on climate change, then
there is at least an argument that natural gas-fired power
plants and coal-fired power plants ought to be treated equally,
and that reduced use of either is an unequivocal environmental
good. Despite the fact that coal combustion emits about twice
would be considerably less expensive than an all-renewables grid. See J.P. MORGAN,
supra note 116, at 9–10.
123 This data was taken from ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS 1998: ISSUES
AND TRENDS 58 (1999), https://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/n
atural_gas_1998_issues_trends/pdf/it98.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU2A-NT6M].
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as much carbon dioxide as natural gas combustion, there is a
legitimate dispute over whether substituting natural gas-fired
power for coal-fired power represents a climate change benefit,
since methane, another potent greenhouse gas,124 leaks into the
atmosphere as part of the natural gas production industry. The
Environmental Defense Fund is currently undertaking a
portfolio of studies aimed at measuring methane leakage from
natural gas production activities.125 These and other studies are
beginning to fill in our understanding of methane leakage rates
in natural gas production systems. Preliminary results from
those studies show a wide variety of leakage rates in different
parts of the country and different parts of the industry.126 The
bulk of the evidence, however, points toward average leakage
rates below the rate at which the climate change harm done by
reliance on natural gas equals that associated with reliance on
coal for electric generation.127 However, the jury is still out on
this question. Importantly, recently enacted and proposed EPA
rules addressing methane leakage in the natural gas production
system ought to eventually reduce these leakage rates
considerably, if those rules survive the presidential transition.128
124 For a summary of this debate, see David B. Spence, The Political Economy of
Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351, 366–67 (2014). Over its life cycle in the atmosphere, a
molecule of methane traps about twenty-five times the heat of a molecule of carbon
dioxide; over the twenty-year span during which that methane molecule persists in the
atmosphere, it traps more than eighty times the heat of the much longer-lived carbon
dioxide molecule. See How Much Worse Is Methane than CO2 as a Greenhouse Gas?,
CHEMISTRY STACK EXCH., https://chemistry.stackexchange.com/questions/40371/how-
much-worse-is-methane-than-co2-as-greenhouse-gas [https://perma.cc/39AT-FNC3].
125 The Climate Impacts of Methane Emissions, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://
www.edf.org/energy/methaneleakage [https://perma.cc/6HAP-5RZN].
126 See CTR. FORCLIMATECHANGE&ENERGY SOLUTIONS, LEVERAGINGNATURAL
GAS TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 21 (2013), http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/
leveraging-natural-gas-reduce-ghg-emissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/N83J-RSLX].
127 See Andrew Burnham et al., Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Shale
Gas, Natural Gas, Coal, and Petroleum, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 619 (2012) (concluding that
the life-cycle GHG emissions from natural gas combustion are about a third lower than
those associated with coal combustion); Nathan Hultman et al., The Greenhouse Impact of
Unconventional Gas for Electricity Generation, 6 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2011) (concluding
that the life-cycle GHG emissions from natural gas combustion are about 56% of those
associated with coal combustion); Francis O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, Shale Gas
Production: Potential Versus Actual Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1
(2012) (concluding that emissions of GHGs from hydraulic fracturing have not significantly
altered the GHG profile of the natural gas industry); David T. Allen et al.,Measurements of
Methane Emissions at Natural Gas Production Sites in the United States, 110 PNAS 17768
(2013) (concluding that emissions from natural gas production sites using reduced emission
completions were well below EPA estimates); Christopher L. Weber & Christopher Clavin,
Life Cycle Carbon Footprint of Shale Gas: Review of Evidence and Implications, 46 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. 5688 (2012) (concluding that emissions of GHGs from hydraulic fracturing
have not significantly altered the GHG profile of the natural gas industry).
128 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490
(Aug. 16, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63); see also Gina McCarthy, EPA Taking
2017] PARADOXES OF “DECARBONIZATION” 473
Climate effects aside, quantitative risk assessments of the
harm done by non-GHG pollutants emitted by fossil fuel
combustion indicate that those other pollutants are at least as
harmful as GHG emissions. EPA’s cost-benefit analysis of its
Clean Power Plan (CPP) values the emissions reductions
triggered by the CPP at between $19 and $51 billion, depending
on the discount rate and the compliance methods used.129 At a 5%
rate, the benefits of GHG reductions by 2025 total $6.4 billion; at
a 3% rate those benefits equal $20 billion.130 In any case, the
benefits associated with non-GHG emissions dominate EPA’s
estimates of harms averted by the rule, and are significant and
almost entirely associated with coal-fired power, not gas-fired
power. Indeed, perhaps the best-kept secret in the popular energy
policy debate is just how much more deadly coal-fired power is
than natural gas-fired power. By most estimates, coal combustion
kills more than 10,000 Americans (and millions of non-
Americans) prematurely each year.131 A succession of studies in
recent years from the National Academy of Sciences,132 health
experts,133 and economists134 have quantified the uniquely
devastating impacts of coal combustion. If we were to include the
harm to health and the environment from coal-fired power in the
price of coal-fired electricity, it would increase that price by
Steps to Cut Methane Emissions from Existing Oil and Gas Sources, EPA CONNECT (Mar.
10, 2016, 9:13 AM), https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2016/03/epa-taking-steps-to-cut-methane-
emissions-from-existing-oil-and-gas-sources/ [https://perma.cc/YH8R-SK6Y] (stating that
“EPA will begin developing regulations for methane emissions from existing oil and gas
sources. We will start this work immediately to address methane from existing sources.
We intend to work swiftly, and will involve stakeholders in meaningful ways, as we have
been doing all along.”).
129 EPA, REGULATORY IMPACTANALYSIS FOR THECLEAN POWER PLAN FINALRULE
ES-20–ES-21 (2015). Because the harm attributed to climate change is further in the future
than the harm attributable to other pollutants, estimates of the dollar value of GHG-related
harm are larger when the discount rate (the rate at which future dollars are discounted
against current dollars) is smaller.
130 Id. at ES-20.
131 See, e.g., Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal,
1219 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 91 (2011) (citing a 2010 Clean Air Task Force Report
putting the number of American fatalities at 13,000 “due to air pollution from all electricity
generation in 2010”). Researchers at NASA and Columbia University estimate that nuclear
power has averted 1.84 million air pollution-related deaths worldwide that would have
resulted from fossil fuel combustion but for reliance on nuclear energy. See Pushker A.
Kharecha & James E. Hansen, Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Historical and Projected Nuclear Power, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4889, 4891 (2013).
132 Press Release, Nat’l Acads., Report Examines Hidden Health and
Environmental Costs of Energy Production and Consumption in U.S. (Oct. 19, 2009),
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/NAS%20study%20on%20costs%20
of%20energy.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJC9-S6ZU] (estimating the cost of coal combustion
at more than $62 billion annually).
133 See Epstein et al., supra note 131, at 93 (estimating the cost of national reliance
on coal for energy at hundreds of billions of dollars annually over its full life cycle).
134 See Nicholas Z. Muller et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the
United States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649 (2011).
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approximately 35% (more than 3.5 cents/kwh); the comparable
number for natural gas combustion is 5% (0.5 cents/kwh).135
This matters because, as Figure 1 indicates,136 natural gas
and coal compete within the electric generation mix. In much of
the country, coal’s losses are natural gas’s gains and vice versa.
Indeed, Germany’s clean energy policy, the Energiewende, has
demonstrated clearly that the aggressive promotion of renewables
does not necessarily imply reduced carbon emissions.137 German
policies that disadvantage nuclear power138 and gas-fired power139
have forced Germany to continue to burn large amounts of coal
for electricity in order to maintain system reliability, even as the
country aggressively incentivized renewables. Like Germany, the
United States has a large stock of existing coal-fired generating
capacity ready to be dispatched each day when the price is
right;140 the fate of that coal capacity is much more closely tied
to its relative competitiveness with existing natural gas-fired
plants than to its relationship to renewables. Therefore,
proponents of decarbonization ought to shed the assumption that
all policies that discourage the use of natural gas will produce
environmental gains. Sometimes they will, and sometimes they
will not.
C. The Fairness Paradox
Some commentators141 and policymakers142 see distributed
energy resources, particularly rooftop solar and DR, as central
135 Id. at 1670, tbl.5.
136 See supra Figure 1.
137 Robert Wilson, Why Germany’s Nuclear Phase Out Is Leading to More Coal
Burning, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.theenergycollective.com/
robertwilson190/328841/why-germanys-nuclear-phase-out-leading-more-coal-burning
[https://perma.cc/5MJ4-ALGG].
138 Tim Smedley, Goodbye Nuclear Power: Germany’s Renewable Energy
Revolution, GUARDIAN (May 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
nuclear-power-germany-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/GTZ7-73V6].
139 See Harriet Torry, German Cabinet Approves Anti-Fracking Draft Law, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/german-cabinet-approves-anti-fracking-
draft-law-1427896555 [https://perma.cc/X5SV-YLD8].
140 The average American coal-fired power plant is more than forty years old,
meaning that the original capital investments in many of those plants have long since
been paid off. See Steven Mufson, Vintage U.S. Coal-Fired Power Plants Now an ‘Aging
Fleet of Clunkers’, WASH. POST (June 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/a-dilemma-with-aging-coal-plants-retire-them-or-restore-them/2014/06/
13/8914780a-f00a-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html?utm_term=.eca5dfdb85a9 [https://
perma.cc/8FHA-WNHV]. They can therefore offer relatively inexpensive power to the
market. See Adelman & Spence, supra note 7, 153 tbl.3.
141 For a recent discussion of this literature, see Shelley Welton, Clean
Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571 (2017).
142 New York’s “Reforming Energy Vision” initiative is the most prominent of the
state policies. See Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework and Implementation Plan
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elements of a decarbonized grid. As “behind-the-meter” options
become more affordable, they can break the stronghold IOUs have
on electricity generation in hybrid and traditional markets.
Traditional ratemaking provides IOUs with little incentive to
invest in renewables,143 and many traditional markets lack RPSs
and the market for renewable power they create.144 Furthermore,
state law in some hybrid and traditional markets inhibits non-
IOU, third-party ownership of rooftop solar power.145 In all these
ways, the IOU retail monopoly can prevent or slow
decarbonization. In competitive states, by contrast, advocates of
decarbonization see DER (and DR) as a way to promote their goal
more affordably, by avoiding the costs of building expensive
transmission lines to bring utility-scale renewables to the grid.146
Decarbonization through DER, however, poses a fairness
problem in most traditional and hybrid states. In competitive
states, unbundling implies that customers pay separately for
at 3, 11, No. 14-M-0101 (N.Y. P.U.C. Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Order Adopting Regulatory
Policy Framework] (emphasizing the need to tap the “enormous and largely untapped
resource” of the “customer side of the grid”). There are similar initiatives in Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Hawaii, California, and Maryland. See, e.g., Investigation by the Dep’t of Pub.
Util. on Its Own Motion into Modernization of the Electric Grid, at 1 (Mass. Dep’t of Pub.
Util., June 12, 2014) (initiative designed, in part, to “empower customers to manage and
reduce their energy costs”); Proposed Decision on Order Instituting Rulemaking on the
Commission’s Own Motion to Conduct a Comprehensive Examination of Investor Owned
Electric Utilities’ Residential Rate Structures, the Transition to Time Varying and Dynamic
Rates, and Other Statutory Obligations, R. 12-06-013 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 21, 2015); EXHIBITA:
COMMISSION’S INCLINATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HAWAII’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES 1–3 (2014),
http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Commissions-Inclinations.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RRP6-SV55]; Nancy Lange et al., Building a Minnesota Conversation on Grid
Modernization with a Focus on Distribution Systems (May 12, 2015), http://mn.gov/puc/
documents/pdf_files/grid_modernization_5-12-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XDF-6SLY]
(outline of presentation) (also aimed at helping customers become more active
managers of their consumption).
143 Welton, supra note 141, at 588 (“States where the electricity industry
remains ‘vertically integrated’ . . . may be less inclined to adopt a full-throated version of
the participatory grid than their counterparts that have more fully opened their
electricity sectors up to competition.”).
144 The correlation is evident particularly in the southeastern United States.
Compare Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
(Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850 [https://perma.cc/C
K8K-7R3R] (demonstrating the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s map of
states with RPSs), with Seth Blumsack, Deregulation or Restructuring?, PENN STATE
UNIV., https://www.e-education.psu.edu/eme801/node/534 [https://perma.cc/JU8K-JRED]
(displaying its map of states that have restructured their retail markets).
145 In many traditionally regulated states, only utilities can engage in retail sales.
Thus, any financing arrangement under which a third-party owner of rooftop solar panels
would sell power generated by the panels to the homeowner on whose roof the panels sit is
prohibited. For a discussion of this issue, see Neil Peretz, Growing the Energy Efficiency
Market Through Third-Party Financing, 30ENERGYL.J. 377, 391–92 (2009).
146 Under the New York plan, utilities would become distribution system
providers, platforms over which consumers and producers alike would participate as both
buyers and sellers of a broader array of electricity services (including demand response and
distributed generation services).
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power and delivery of power, and those payments go to different
companies. But in hybrid and traditional states, monopoly IOUs
impose a single charge on their customers reflecting both the
payment for power consumed and payment for the service of
delivering the power (which includes the customer’s share of the
fixed costs of operating the grid). The customer pays a single,
bundled rate based on the amount of power consumed. Under
such a system, however, the portion of the grid investment
dedicated to serving a particular customer does not necessarily
track the amount of power that customer consumes, especially
when customers begin to generate their own power.
The problem arises when rooftop solar owners who pay
bundled rates are compensated at the full retail price for power
they no longer consume. This is what happens in a so-called
“net-metering” regime: customers pay the retail rate only for
their net consumption. Under net metering, customers with
rooftop solar arrays consume much less power, and contribute
much less to the cost of maintaining the grid, even though they
remain connected to the grid and can consume power from the
grid whenever they need it. When their solar panels fail, or the
sun does not shine, customers continue to consume power from
the grid (using grid capacity) at the prior levels, but they will
be paying for that capacity at a reduced level—one reflecting
their (now lower) monthly volumetric consumption of power.147
The vast majority of states compensate rooftop solar owners for
power using this sort of net-metering regime.148
Critics of net metering argue that this is a subsidy paid
to rooftop solar owners by other customers, and that rooftop solar
owners ought to pay a demand charge reflecting the portion of the
grid dedicated to their use.149 A few traditional and hybrid states
have adopted these so-called “demand charges,”150 but calculating
demand charges is not always straightforward. For example,
assume that I install a solar panel on my roof, and my average
instantaneous peak demand on summer afternoons decreases
from N kW to N/4 kW, because my solar panels provide power
147 See, e.g., Griselda Blackburn et al., Solar Valuation and the Modern Utility’s
Expansion into Distributed Generation, ELEC. J., Jan.–Feb. 2014, at 26; Ryan Hledik,
Rediscovering Residential Demand Charges, ELEC. J., Aug.–Sept. 2014, at 84.
148 Welton, supra note 141, at 574 (more than forty states employ net
metering in this way).
149 See, e.g., David B. Raskin, The Regulatory Challenge of Distributed
Generation, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 38, 40–42 (2013).
150 See, e.g., Net Metering, NV ENERGY, https://www.nvenergy.com/renewables
environment/renewablegenerations/NetMetering.cfm [https://perma.cc/YGD2-CHAK]
(describing Nevada Energy’s separate charges for capacity (called a “basic service charge”)
and energy for net metering customers).
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formerly purchased from the grid. That average instantaneous
peak, N/4 kW, represents an instantaneous demand of 0 kW on
75% of summer afternoons, and instantaneous demand of N kW
on 25% of afternoons (when the sun is not shining). What should
my demand charge be? Should it reflect N kW or N/4 kW of
capacity usage?
Defenders of net metering argue that critics—utilities, in
particular—are merely trying to discourage investment in
renewables, particularly distributed renewables.151 They argue,
further, that rooftop solar adopters confer benefits on the system
in the form of (1) cleaner power, which inures to the benefit of
everyone as it displaces dirtier fossil fuel energy, and (2) improved
system reliability, by reducing (afternoon) peak demand and,
thereby, the probability of an outage.152 Therefore, they say, net
metering is a fair method of compensating these providers for
their services. A small minority of jurisdictions have adopted a
middle ground approach, namely, “value of solar tariffs” (VOST),
which compensates rooftop solar owners for the power they
dispatch to the grid at a rate less than the full retail rate, but
typically greater than the wholesale power rate. The VOST
typically reflects some credit for the environmental and
reliability benefits of rooftop solar.153 The environmental benefits
conferred by rooftop solar panels, however, are spread far beyond
the utility’s service area, raising questions about whether other
grid customers actually capture the benefits the rooftop solar
owner is conferring. Similarly, one can challenge the argument
that rooftop solar enhances the reliability of the distribution
system, since in many places rooftop solar generation is
unavailable during the latter portions of the afternoon peak,
creating balancing challenges for grid operators.154
151 See TOM STANTON, NAT’L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., STATE AND UTILITY
SOLAR ENERGY PROGRAMS: RECOMMENDED APPROACHES FOR GROWING MARKETS, at iv
(2013); Welton, supra note 141, at 576; Troy A. Rule, The Power of Pricing: Smarter Rate
Design for the Rooftop Solar Age (Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State
University, Working Paper, 2017) (on file with author).
152 For a discussion of the fairness issue, and common rejoinders to the claim that
net metering poses fairness concerns, see Welton, supra note 141. See Rule, supra note 151
(arguing that other cross-subsidies are common, and accepted, within electric rates).
153 See, e.g., CLEAN POWER RESEARCH, 2014 VALUE OF SOLAR AT AUSTIN ENERGY
2 (2013), http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=199131 [https://perma.cc/K
LS3-ANA3] (explaining in detail the value of solar calculation for the City of Austin
municipal utility); CLEAN POWER RESEARCH, MINNESOTA VALUE OF SOLAR: METHODOLOGY
(2014), https://www.cleanpower.com/wp-content/uploads/MN-VOS-Methodology-2014-01-30-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU9E-5J96].
154 See, e.g., CAL. ISO, WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS US ABOUT MANAGING A
GREEN GRID, https://www.caiso.com/Documents/FlexibleResourcesHelpRenewables_Fast
Facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CV5-BCKM] (explaining how California’s sudden absence of
solar power at sundown poses grid management problems there).
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Furthermore, even if the total benefits of distributed
solar generation exceed the total costs, under either net
metering or VOSTs, the remaining ratepayers on the utility’s
portion of the grid are left to pay larger shares of the fixed costs
of maintaining the grid, strengthening the incentive of others to
install distributed energy resources, or DERs.155 Because rooftop
solar adopters tend to have higher incomes than other customers,
net metering (and, to a lesser extent, VOSTs) are regressive
policies.156 As net metering and other incentives continue to
promote rooftop solar generation, more relatively wealthy
customers pay a declining share of the fixed costs of maintaining
the grid, leaving those costs to a shrinking set of customers unable
or unwilling to invest in rooftop solar. This is decarbonization’s
fairness paradox, and it is part of what has become known in the
electricity industry as “the utility death spiral.”157
III. TOWARD AMORE SOPHISTICATED PATH TO
DECARBONIZATION
The direct route to rapid, deep decarbonization—policies
that simply subsidize or promote unending renewable
generation—produces unintended consequences. On the one
hand, the environmental benefits of ever-more renewables will be
few in parts of the country where coal-fired power backs up
155 PETER BRONSKI ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., THE ECONOMICS OF GRID
DEFECTION: WHEN ANDWHEREDISTRIBUTED SOLARGENERATIONPLUS STORAGECOMPETES
WITHTRADITIONALUTILITYSERVICE 6 (2014).
156 See Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework, supra note 142, at 2 (“[T]he
trend toward affordability of self-generation threatens to create an unacceptable gap
between those who can choose to leave the grid and those who cannot, with implications for
the obligation to ensure reasonably priced and reliable service.”). But cf. Welton, supra note
141 (arguing that DER also serves other participatory values and that policymakers can
incentivize opportunities for less wealthy customers to participate in DERs).
157 See BRONSKI ET AL., supra note 155, at 11. The death spiral encompasses at
least two potential dynamics triggered by high levels of renewables penetration. The
first is the fairness paradox associated with renewable DERs described here. If a large
number of customers generate most of their own power and do not pay a charge to
maintain the grid, net metering leaves a dwindling number of customers relying on the
grid for electricity, paying increasing shares of the cost of maintaining the grid. The
second focuses on the way utility-scale renewables decrease spot power prices in spot
markets, described supra Section II.A.1. Theoretically, if zero-marginal-cost resources
come to dominate the grid, long-run average spot prices could be pushed to levels lower
than the long-run average cost incurred by every generator, making investment in power
generation a losing proposition absent additional payments to ensure the availability of
capacity. This scenario is analogous to the “death spiral” problem faced by the precursor
to the California Public Utilities Commission in the mid-twentieth century, when
streetcars (whose rates the CPUC then regulated) faced increasing competition from
other forms of transportation. The streetcar company sought a rate increase necessary to
recover their costs from a dwindling customer base. The courts ultimately declined to use
public utility law to insulate the streetcars from competitive pressures SeeMarket St. Ry.
Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
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renewables. On the other hand, as renewables penetration hits
very high levels, there will be a reckoning—in the form of either
reduced service reliability, or higher costs, or both. Most of these
paradoxes can be avoided by a clean energy strategy that retains
focus on utility-scale renewables growth supported by generation
technologies that some may find environmentally objectionable:
new gas-fired, nuclear, or storage-mode hydropower.
Some of the proponents of a route to decarbonization that
discourages both gas-fired and nuclear power seem insufficiently
sensitive to these paradoxes. They may instead be betting on
rapid technological and cost advantages in storage technology
that would obviate the need for backup generation.158 Grid-scale
storage could include batteries, compressed air storage,159
flywheels,160 and the aforementioned pumped storage
hydroelectric power. Consumer-scale storage would include
mostly batteries or some forms of thermal storage.161 Can we rely
on technological optimism, that if we mandate storage or
otherwise create the extreme need for storage by phasing out
reliable generating plants, the market will provide clean,
affordable storage?
Certainly, environmental law has a long history of
establishing aggressive goals so as to force technological change
and increase cost efficiencies. The Clean Air Act, for example, is
based on this logic, and experience with that statute suggests
room for optimism about the industry’s ability to comply with
aggressive targets in affordable ways. Historically, ex ante industry
estimates of compliance costs have sometimes been orders of
magnitude higher than actual costs.162 Environmental NGOs and
other proponents of a renewables-only strategy may have this
experience in mind when advocating for a system without natural
158 Storage could be used in conjunction with DR, as well. But DR represents a
small resource in percentage terms. One estimate puts DR potential at about 29 GW,
representing less than 3% of the generating capacity of the grid. Robert Walton, U.S.
Demand Response Potential Grows to 29 GW, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.utility
dive.com/news/us-demand-response-potential-grows-to-29-gw/348409/ [https://perma.cc/C5G
M-XZQA]. Moreover, most existing DR comes from nonresidential customers, many of
whom employ alternate generation sources (some fossil-fueled) in lieu of purchases from
the grid.
159 For a description of how compressed air energy storage works, see
Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES), ENERGY STORAGE ASS’N, http://energystorage.
org/compressed-air-energy-storage-caes [https://perma.cc/KA3N-4JQM].
160 For a description of how flywheels work, see Flywheels, ENERGY STORAGE
ASS’N, http://energystorage.org/energy-storage/storage-technology-comparisons/thermal
[https://perma.cc/CG6A-B2LA].
161 For a description of how distributed thermal storage might work, see
Thermal, ENERGY STORAGE ASS’N, http://energystorage.org/energy-storage/storage-
technology-comparisons/thermal2 [https://perma.cc/H9DL-DNHE].
162 SeeWinston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates,
19 J. POL’YANALYSIS&MGMT. 297, 314 (2000) (confirming this general truth).
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gas or nuclear power. As renewables command a larger share of
generation, a few states (California, for example) will force more
grid-scale storage on the system, others (New York, for example)
seem likely to encourage much more DER growth.163 Both states
rely extensively on natural gas-fired power to back up renewables
now.164 For states hoping to wean themselves off of nuclear or gas-
fired power, Germany offers a cautionary tale. The unavailability
of nuclear and gas-fired power to back up renewables has slowed
Germany’s efforts to reduce reliance on coal-fired power, and its
electricity costs are about three-times the U.S. average when
subsidies are included in the price.165
Thus, the tradeoffs between cost, reliability, and
environmental performance seem unavoidable. Even if one
assumes great leaps forward in electricity storage technology to
solve the reliability problem, deep decarbonization will still be
expensive. It will entail huge investments in transmission and
redundant generation to compensate for the lower capacity
factors of renewable generators and to charge batteries.
Distributed generation seems unlikely to offer enough capacity
to fully (or at least significantly) mitigate that problem.166 For
that reason, in most places, during the transition toward ever-
more renewables, grid operators will find ways to ensure that
there is central station generation ready and available when
renewables go offline. That may mean compensating existing
generators on the system to remain on the system beyond the
time they would otherwise shut down. In some parts of the
country, the available existing facilities will be coal-fired; in
others, they may be gas-fired or nuclear facilities. Worries
about future reliability may be driving New York’s decision to
offer incentives to extend the life of nuclear plants in the
state,167 and discussions of “reregulation” in Ohio and Michigan.168
163 See discussion of state plans to rely on DERs and DR, supra note 142.
164 Natural gas-fired generators ramp up and down efficiently and quickly, and
natural gas dominates each state’s electricity generation mix. See U.S. States: State Profiles
and Energy Estimates, supra note 97 (listing U.S. EIA State Profiles).
165 Average Electricity Prices Around the World: $/kWh, OVO ENERGY, https://
www.ovoenergy.com/guides/energy-guides/average-electricity-prices-kwh.html [https://
perma.cc/HG7Q-5UGH].
166 PIETER GAGNON ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ROOFTOP SOLAR
PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNICAL POTENTIAL IN THE UNITED STATES: A DETAILED ASSESSMENT,
at vi–vii (2016) (estimating that as much as 39% of total U.S. electric generation could
come from distributed renewables).
167 See Robert Walton, With Clean Energy Standard, New York Looks to Save
Nukes, Skirt Legal Challenges, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/
news/with-clean-energy-standard-new-york-looks-to-save-nukes-skirt-legal-chall/423673/
[https://perma.cc/UZU7-HQUV] (describing price supports for two nuclear plants in New
York State).
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Grid operators can try to ensure reliability using ad hoc
arrangements with individual plants. But it would be better if
policymakers tackled these reliability and cost questions head-on,
and chose their favored transition paths with explicit recognition
of the potential environmental, cost, and distributional effects of
their choices. Otherwise, they could do more environmental harm
than good during the transition. They could redistribute costs
from rich to poor. They could compromise reliability (unlikely), or
impose more costs on ratepayers than necessary to achieve the
same environmental benefit during the transition (likely). Most
voters, and most of their elected representatives, are not
electricity policy experts. To the contrary, they rely on experts to
help them understand the important dimensions of a transition to
a decarbonized electricity future. To avoid the unintended
consequences implied by the three paradoxes, experts should
frame their analyses in ways that enable voters and elected
officials to understand the tradeoffs in concrete terms.
For example, given the out-of-pocket cost to ratepayers of
a rapid transition to an all-renewables grid, it is misleading to
suggest that the obstacles to that transition are
“not . . . economic.”169 Politicians and ratepayers deserve to
know not only that the dollar value of the averted pollution
harm exceeds the cost of investment in new renewable
generation, transmission lines, storage, and rarely used back up
generation. They also deserve to know what those out-of-pocket
costs will be, and the extent to which estimates of those costs
depend upon optimism about the relative costs of clean
technologies in the future, or about the ability to secure siting
approval for the necessary plants and transmission lines. They
deserve to know how policies that discourage natural gas-fired
generation and nuclear generation may affect system reliability
and their out-of-pocket costs, and how those options compare to
reliance on storage or other technologies to back up renewable
generation. They deserve to know whether discouraging gas-
fired and nuclear power now may slow the decline of coal-fired
generation in the future and the health and environmental
168 See RAYMOND L. GIFFORD & MATTHEW S. LARSON, WILKINSON BARKER
KNAUER, LLP, STATE ACTIONS IN ORGANIZEDMARKETS: STATES STRIVE TO ‘FIX’MARKETS
AND RETAIN BASE LOAD GENERATION 4–9 (2016), http://e67ti2w9ws71al8xmnhsozd3.w
pengine.netdna-cdn.com/files/2016/09/BaseloadWilkersonEtcPaper0916.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9FQY-QSSQ] (describing efforts by utilities to secure income guarantees for existing
generating units in competitive markets).
169 See Mark Jacobson: Barriers to 100% Clean Energy Are Social and
Political, Not Technical or Economic, supra note 111. This is based on the notion that
the averted pollution harm has a higher dollar value than the cost of implementing an
all-renewables grid.
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consequences of that choice. They deserve to know how the
benefits and costs of net-metering policies are distributed across
(and beyond) a utility’s distribution system.
Advocates of deep decarbonization would do well to be
transparent about how they propose to make tradeoffs between
cost, reliability, and environmental performance, particularly
in the wake of the 2016 presidential election, which many have
interpreted as a populist revolt against “liberal elites.” Policies
that increase ratepayers’ out-of-pocket costs in order to reduce
environmental costs may seem logical or sensible to some, but
not to others. Moreover, the way individuals value these
tradeoffs seems likely to be correlated with wealth. A relatively
wealthy person may place a higher value on a clean
environment than a poor person, and may be more willing to
spend a larger sum of money to secure that benefit because that
sum represents a smaller portion of her disposable income. And
a relatively wealthy person may be more willing to accept a less
reliable electric grid because she is better able to afford behind-
the-meter backup power. That is, deep decarbonization involves
decisions about tradeoffs that liberal elites might make quite
differently from others.
While most experts acknowledge these tradeoffs in
principle, the discussion becomes less transparent as it moves
from analysis to advocacy. Advocates of renewable technologies
may believe they have little to gain from transparency, or from
acknowledging the attractive aspects of competing technologies or
the unattractive aspects of their preferred technologies. For
example, as discussed above, natural gas-fired generation is an
affordable, flexible, and reliable complement to renewable
generation; but inexpensive gas-fired power drives down
electricity spot prices (and, therefore, revenue) for all electric
generation technologies, not just coal-fired power. When natural
gas prices increase, or when gas-fired power exits the system, all
the competing electric generation technologies benefit, including
coal-fired power. Nor do wind and solar firms benefit from a focus
on the reliability of their more expensive zero-emission
competitors—storage-mode hydroelectric power and nuclear
power. Rather, they are satisfied with a market that makes cost
distinctions, but not reliability distinctions, between different
zero-emission technologies.
CONCLUSION
Thanks to market forces and state policies, decarbonization
seems likely to proceed apace, despite the presidential transition.
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How quickly and how deeply the U.S. grid decarbonizes remains
a point of contention. Thus far, grid operators have managed to
incorporate much larger percentages of renewable power than
they anticipated. But the reckoning—hard choices about
reliability-cost tradeoffs associated with very high levels of
renewables penetration—is coming eventually. We will be better
prepared to handle the reckoning later if we make policy
decisions now with that objective in sight. The direct route to
rapid, deep decarbonization seems to sidestep or ignore the
reckoning, or relies on technological or economic breakthroughs
that may never come to pass. When planning the path to a clean
energy future, the shortest distance between two points may not
be a straight line.
